Various commentators, politicians and analysts have attempted to characterise Mangaung, to define the moment’s essential nature. Below are two takes I found interesting with some words from me on why I found them thus. After that I include a more general summary of what happened with the voting results for the Top Six and the National Executive Committee.
M&G: will the scandal prone authoritarian traditionalist and the constitutionalist businessman lick the platter clean together?
Nic Dawes – editor of the doughty Mail & Guardian suggested (on December 21 2012) that Zuma has moved the ANC “dangerously away” from the urban and middle classes and is starting to overtly exhibit rural, patriarchal and authoritarian values inimical to the middle classes. He suggests that Cyril Ramaphosa’s election at Mangaung is (ultimately) an attempt to woo urban and middle class voters back to the ANC – with Zuma having secured traditional and rural support. But, asks Dawes, “can the constitutionalist businessperson avoid contamination by association with a scandal prone, authoritarian traditionalist?”
Good question … except that I am starting to realise that Zuma would never have appointed Ramaphosa if he posed a potential threat in any way at any stage no matter how far they (the Zuma camp) are looking into the future. Ramaphosa is in the house … the Nkandla house … it’s too late for decontamination.
Dawes also makes the useful formulation that Motlanthe’s challenge was a principled attempt to “confront the ANC with the enormity of its Jacob Zuma problem”. I think Dawes is right – or at least that the Motlanthe strategists he spoke to had this conception of what they were up to. However the whole Motlanthe endeavour feels much more like the foolish (but strangely attractive) arrogance of Don Quixote tilting at windmills, or, more tragically, this stupid and noble rush onto heavily defended enemy positions:
Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
Read the brilliant, awful, manipulative (in my admittedly limited estimation) Tennyson poem and its glorification of cruel and stupid military and administrative incompetence here – ok, glorification of those acting as a result of such incompetence . (You will see from voting patterns at the end of this post that it was closer to 1000 than 600, but aside from that I thought the Tennyson metaphor held up rather well?)
The nationalists, anti-nonracial, populist versus the … who?
If I was on one of those TV or radio programmes that specialise in asking stupid questions right at the end, and I was asked: which South African political analyst do you rate highest? Then “Steven Friedman” is the answer that would most likely trip off my tongue.
With that disclaimer, I am forced to take issue with an aspect of his characterisation of what happened at Mangaung (published in the Business Day – 27/12/12 – here for that link).
Friedman characterises the Anyone But Zuma or Forces For Change (that is the defeated faction at Mangaung) as “the nationalist group, which wants a bigger black share of business … and whose members use radical-sounding language to pursue that goal.” No quibble from me there.
But then Friedman goes on to characterise the group that opposed ‘the nationalists’, that is the group that was victorious at Mangaung, as “a loose alliance stretching from the left to centrist business people who believe the nationalists threaten the ANC’s commitment to nonracialism and are corrupting the movement because they are too close to the wealthy.”
The implicit injunction, one I believe we should resist, is: choose a better devil.
Break it down (and I paraphrase what I imagine the argument would have to entail – and I am taking this much further than is implicit in Friedman’s article, but his argument leads inevitably to this point):
We support both Jacob Zuma (the patriarchal and authoritarian traditionalist with rigid and ruthless control of the security establishment and the ANC – and we support him despite his family and friends having become fabulously wealthy since his winning to high office) and Cyril Ramaphosa (the billionaire ex-unionist who has effectively used the black economic empowerment imperative to accumulate his wealth and will occupy his office with zero power and purely at the beck and call of the Nkandla Crew).
… because …
… they are a whole lot better than the nationalist, anti-nonracial Julius Malema, Tokyo Sexwale, Mathews Phosa, Fikile Mbalula and ANC Youth League?
I think not.
Extract from my summary as of last week
The expected
- The leadership and policy results of the African National Congress National Conference was a strongly status quo outcome and a victory for the incumbents (the Zuma camp) and their political and economic policies
- The leadership challenge to Zuma (with Kgalema Motlanthe the unwilling champion of that challenge) was routed, as was the policy platform most closely associated with the challengers (the nationalisation of mines). The extent of the victory is clearly and accurately revealed in the leadership election results detailed in Addendum 1.
- Cyril Ramaphosa’s election as deputy president has been heralded in much of the financial and popular press as a market-friendly outcome and, in some versions, a salvation of the ANC. It should be pointed out, however, that whatever qualities Ramaphosa possesses (and in my experience he possesses many excellent qualities) these will be exercised as the deputy to an extremely confident and powerful (in party and state terms) president, a president at whose behest Ramaphosa will serve and as a result of whose political influence Ramaphosa was elected. To further dampen any untoward enthusiasm it should be pointed out that Ramaphosa has no base in any constituency within the ANC or within the ruling alliance.
- Because the National Conference of the ANC is not the kind of forum in which decisive interventions or radical new directions can be formulated (it takes place over 5 days, has a long and complex agenda, entails many rounds of voting by 4000-plus branch delegates who are often unskilled in policy matters and who are generally organised into large voting blocks by contending factions for leadership) there were no such interventions and (no unexpectedly) new policy directions.
- However, the full policy platform of the incumbents, which does entail significant new state intervention in the economy (described and assessed by me in interminable detail elsewhere) was accepted in full (but in a very broad, vague, poorly attended and poorly discussed commission process at the conference.) The ANC is yet to publish the full policy resolution of the conference and I expect it to be a carefully phrased call for more state intervention, but in a language unlikely to alarm financial markets. The details here are important but I will have to postpone further analysis until the ANC decides it has crafted the resolution carefully enough.
The less expected
- Mangaung did only confirm policy and political trends that were already extant – and widely known. However the extent of the dominance of the Zuma camp and the weakness of the challengers took some commentators by surprise – see Addendum 1 for the details of the election results.
- The total failure of the political factions aligned to the ANC Youth League to make any impact on the conference policy-making process did come as a surprise to me – I would have thought there would be a rear-guard action around the ‘nationalisation of mines’ call, but none appeared (to me, anyway).
- It would have been politic for the Zuma camp to allow some of those who challenged for the top six positions (and their allies) to be represented on the 80 person National Executive Committee. It seems that either the desire to demonstrate total dominance won the day, or the Zuma strategists lost control of the popular mobilisation against the challengers. Either way it leaves a huge internal constituency of the ANC (roughly 25%) without representation at any leadership level within the party – an obviously destabilising outcome. However the Zuma camp is likely to invite some of the excluded individuals back into leadership positions, on terms satisfactory to the victors.
(Post Scrip reminder: outstanding is the ANC National Conference resolution on policy. The resolution that emerged out of the June Policy Conference took several months to formulate and be published. I do not expect the Mangaung Resolution to take things much further than the resolution from the policy conference. Much of the detail will be dealt with in the New Year and largely in Cabinet and government departments, rather than in party structures.)
Addendum 1
… the results below are culled from various news sources and people who attended the conference (I found the full NEC results at Politicsweb).
A – Voting and results for the top six
(Interesting things to note: Zuma got the least votes of all contested positions and Gwede Mantashe the most – an observation I borrowed from Steven Friedman’s previously discussed Business Day article.)
- President – Jacob re-elected with 2983 votes to Kgalema Motlanthe’s 991 votes.
- Deputy President – Cyril Ramaphosa elected with 3018 votes to Mathews Phosa’s 470 and Tokyo Sexwale’s 463.
- Secretary General – Gwede Mantashe re-elected with 3058 votes to Fikile Mbalula’s 901.
- Deputy Secretary General – Jessie Duarte elected unopposed.
- Chairperson – Baleka Mbete re-elected with 3010 votes to Thandi Modise’s 939.
- Treasurer General – Zweli Mkhize elected with 2988 votes to Paul M Mashatile’s 961.
B – Voting and results for the National Executive Committee
(Note that no challenger to the Zuma camp in the top six election was elected to the National Executive Committee. Note, as well, that the only prominent member of the anti-Zuma camp, Winnie Mandela, just scraped onto the list, having topped the poll for the NEC election at Polokwane in 2007.)
Rank | Name | Sex | Votes |
1 | Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana Clarice | F | 2921 |
2 | Gigaba, Malusi | M | 2669 |
3 | Sisulu, Lindiwe | F | 2658 |
4 | Chabane, Collins | M | 2585 |
5 | Radebe, Jeff | M | 2570 |
6 | Pandor, Naledi | F | 2517 |
7 | Hanekom, Derek | M | 2497 |
8 | Gordhan, Pravin | M | 2465 |
9 | Mboweni, Tito | M | 2463 |
10 | Mthethwa, Nathi | M | 2450 |
11 | Sisulu, Max Vuyisile | M | 2442 |
12 | Dlamini, Bathabile Olive | F | 2423 |
13 | Jordan, Zweledinga Pallo | M | 2407 |
14 | Nzimande, Blade | M | 2406 |
15 | Mthembu, Jackson | M | 2387 |
16 | Ndebele, Joel Sibusiso | M | 2379 |
17 | Mapisa-Nqakula, Nosiviwe | F | 2353 |
18 | Motsoaledi, Aaron | M | 2339 |
19 | Godongwana, Enoch | M | 2334 |
20 | Kodwa, Zizi | M | 2306 |
21 | Ebrahim Ebrahim | M | 2303 |
22 | Dlodlo, Ayanda | F | 2300 |
23 | Brown, Lynne | F | 2293 |
24 | Cwele, Siyabonga C | M | 2245 |
25 | Mokonyane, Nomvula Paula | F | 2240 |
26 | Mfeketo, Nomaindia | F | 2228 |
27 | Dlamini, Sidumo Mbongeni | M | 2213 |
28 | Nxesi, Thulas | M | 2202 |
29 | Bhengu, Nozabelo Ruth | F | 2195 |
30 | Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite | M | 2169 |
31 | Bapela, Obed | M | 2167 |
32 | Masetlha, Billy Lesedi | M | 2161 |
33 | Ramatlhodi, Ngoako Abel | M | 2156 |
34 | Davies, Rob | M | 2151 |
35 | Motshekga, Angie | F | 2146 |
36 | Zulu, Lindiwe | F | 2142 |
37 | Netshitenze, Joel | M | 2138 |
38 | Nkwinti, Gugile | M | 2100 |
39 | Joemat-Petterson, Tina | F | 2076 |
40 | Mabhudafhasi, Rejoice | F | 2042 |
41 | Shabangu, Susan | F | 2036 |
42 | Oliphant, Mildred N | F | 2019 |
43 | van der Merwe, Sue | F | 1992 |
44 | Capa-Langa, Zoleka Rosemary | F | 1984 |
45 | Mthembi-Mahanyele, Sankie Dolly | F | 1930 |
46 | Phaahla, Joe | M | 1916 |
47 | Skwatsha, Mcebisi | M | 1888 |
48 | Xasa, Fikile D | M | 1881 |
49 | Majola, Fikile (Slovo) | M | 1872 |
50 | Mashamba, Joyce | F | 1868 |
51 | Tshwete, Pam | F | 1849 |
52 | Mabe, Sisi | F | 1823 |
53 | Sizani, Stone | M | 1803 |
54 | Cele, Bhekokwakhe Hamilton (Bheki) | M | 1736 |
55 | Magadzi, Dikeledi | F | 1732 |
56 | Tolashe, Sisisi | F | 1715 |
57 | Gcabashe, Lungi | F | 1695 |
58 | Mmemezi, Humphrey M Z | M | 1679 |
59 | Dlulane, Beauty N | F | 1674 |
60 | Moloi, Pinky | F | 1664 |
61 | Mokoto, Pinky | F | 1644 |
62 | Mashinini, Sam | M | 1643 |
63 | Zokwana, Senzeni | M | 1600 |
64 | Mabe, Pule | M | 1586 |
65 | Yengeni. Tony Sithembiso | M | 1570 |
66 | Mafu, Nocawe | F | 1549 |
67 | Mahlobo, David | M | 1495 |
68 | Mapulane, Philly | M | 1462 |
69 | Maphatsoe, Kebby | M | 1456 |
70 | Ntwanambi Nosipho, Dorothy | F | 1450 |
71 | Semenya, Machwene Rosinah | F | 1449 |
72 | Segabutla, Miriam | F | 1403 |
73 | Moloi- Moropa, Joyce C | F | 1396 |
74 | Molewa, Ednah | F | 1361 |
75 | Ntombela, Sefora Hixsonia (Sisi) | F | 1348 |
76 | Manganye, Jane | F | 1276 |
77 | Letsatsi-Duba, Dipuo | F | 1057 |
78 | Mtintso, Thenjiwe | F | 875 |
79 | Mandela, Nomzamo Winfred (Winnie) | F | 841 |
80 | Didiza, Thoko | F | 817 |
Thanks for an always enjoyable article. I still don’t get it: if Ramaphosa has such limited and constrained powers, what is he doing there?
Sorry for delay Anthony. I obviously don’t know for sure that Cyril will not make a difference … that has got to be one of the big imponderable of the next while for me. It is not inconceivable that the incumbents lost control of the anti-Kgalema momentum that was coming out of KwazuluNatal, and they were unable to pull back from Cyril at the last minute … and that he does present a possible independent threat to them. Cyril doesn’t have a constituency within the ANC and he doesn’t have the weight of a range of other possible challengers for the presidency in 2017 (Sisulu, Zweli Mkhize. Dlamini-Zuma) but he is not a man without substance and his qualities might lead him into conflict with the incumbents. I think their (Nkandla’s) strength means they could obliterate him him if he stepped out of line, but I think we have to consider him some kind of wild card – and a potential ‘upside risk’ the the bleak view.
Wow, that is a big imponderable. Thanks for your comment; I’ll watch this space!